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Abstract 
Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) 
often share phenotypes of repetitive behaviours, possibly underpinned by abnormal 
decision-making. To compare neural correlates underlying decision-making between 
these disorders, brain-activation of boys with ASD (N=24), OCD (N=20) and 
typically developing controls (N=20) during gambling was compared, and 
computational modelling compared performance. Patients were unimpaired on 
number of risky decisions, but modelling showed that both patient groups had lower 
choice consistency and relied less on reinforcement learning compared to controls. 
ASD individuals had disorder-specific choice perseverance abnormalities compared 
to OCD individuals. Neurofunctionally, ASD and OCD boys shared 
dorsolateral/inferior frontal underactivation compared to controls during decision-
making. During outcome anticipation, patients shared underactivation compared to 
controls in lateral-inferior/orbitofrontal cortex and ventral striatum. During reward 
receipt, ASD boys had disorder-specific enhanced activation in inferior frontal/insular 
regions relative to OCD boys and controls. Results showed that ASD and OCD 
individuals shared decision-making strategies that differed from controls to achieve 
comparable performance to controls. Patients showed shared abnormalities in lateral-
(orbito)fronto-striatal reward circuitry, but ASD boys had disorder-specific lateral 
inferior frontal/insular overactivation, suggesting that shared and disorder-specific 
mechanisms underpin decision-making in these disorders. Findings provide evidence 
for shared neurobiological substrates that could serve as possible future biomarkers. 
Introduction 
 Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) is characterised by social and 
communication difficulties and restricted, repetitive behaviours (American 
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Psychiatric Association, 2013) and affects 0.6-2.0% of the population, with a higher 
prevalence in males (Blumberg et al., 2013). Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) 
is identified by recurrent and intrusive distressing thoughts (obsessions) and repetitive 
rituals (compulsions) (American Psychiatric Association, 2013) and has a prevalence 
of 1-3%, with a slightly higher incidence in males in paediatric samples (Ruscio et al., 
2010). These highly heterogeneous and frequently comorbid disorders can sometimes 
be clinically difficult to separate, as symptoms such as repetitive behaviours in ASD 
can often resemble OCD-related compulsions (Russell et al., 2005). Such overlap has 
been attributed to shared genetic risk and biological mechanisms as well as diagnostic 
mislabelling (Russell et al., 2016), highlighting a need to understand the distinct and 
overlapping underlying neurobiological mechanisms of both disorders.       
 Executive functions (EF) are higher-order cognitive functions important for 
goal-directed behaviour and can be conceptualised dichotomously as “cool” EF, 
referring to non-emotional functions including inhibition and working memory, and 
“hot” EF, referring to functions with reward-based motivation including gambling and 
reward learning (Zelazo and Müller, 2007). Cool EF has been widely investigated in 
ASD and OCD (for reviews, see (Zelazo and Müller, 2007, van Velzen et al., 2014, 
Carlisi et al., 2016c, Norman et al., 2016)). However, relatively less is known about 
the mechanisms underlying reward-related hot EF processes in these disorders, as 
evidence to date has been inconsistent.  
Impaired decision-making has been implicated in both ASD and OCD 
(Cavedini et al., 2006, Luke et al., 2012). The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) (Bechara et 
al., 1994) has been widely used in typically developing populations to measure 
reward-based decision-making and temporal foresight impairments under conditions 
of ambiguity, as it requires reinforcement learning to distinguish between choices that 
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yield large immediate gains but even larger losses (risky options) leading to long-term 
financial losses and decks that give small gains but even smaller losses, leading to 
long-term financial gains at the end of the game (safe options). 
There have been only five studies in ASD using the IGT (Johnson et al., 2006, 
Yechiam et al., 2010, South et al., 2014, Mussey et al., 2015, Zhang et al., 2015), 
showing mixed results. A relatively consistent finding in both children/adolescents 
(Johnson et al., 2006, Yechiam et al., 2010) and adults (Mussey et al., 2015) is that 
ASD individuals shift more frequently between choices, possibly due to difficulties 
with implicit learning (Johnson et al., 2006) or exploration-focused learning strategies 
(Yechiam et al., 2010). Another study in adults with ASD found that the ASD group 
had worse performance, preferring disadvantageous decks (Zhang et al., 2015). 
However, one study (South et al., 2014) in children/adolescents found superior 
performance in ASD adolescents relative to typically developing controls, explained 
by a “loss-avoidance” style of decision-making in the ASD group in contrast to a 
“reward-seeking” style often observed among typically developing adolescents 
(Smith et al., 2012).  
There have been relatively more studies using the IGT in adults with OCD 
(e.g. (Purcell et al., 1998, Cavedini et al., 2002, Cavallaro et al., 2003, Olley et al., 
2007, Cavedini et al., 2010, Starcke et al., 2010, Rocha et al., 2011, Grassi et al., 
2015, Kim et al., 2015)). The majority show impaired decision-making in patients 
relative to controls, with patients preferring large immediate rewards and not learning 
from losses, although there have also been negative findings (Nielen et al., 2002, 
Lawrence et al., 2006, Krishna et al., 2011). Only one study was conducted in 
children with OCD using the IGT which found that patients performed worse relative 
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to controls and that this was related to symptom severity during the most severe 
period of illness (Kodaira et al., 2012).  
The IGT taps a range of cognitive processes including reward-related 
decision-making, reward sensitivity, loss aversion, temporal foresight, inhibitory 
control (to inhibit the contextual ‘thrill’ of immediate gains), and exploratory 
behaviour. Thus, to clarify IGT performance impairments (or lack thereof) in both 
clinical groups, it is important to investigate these cognitive and motivational factors 
on a more nuanced level to better characterise task-performance, and computational 
modelling is a useful tool for this (Huys et al., 2016).  
Similar performance deficits could also be mediated by different underlying 
neurofunctional networks. No functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies, 
however, have yet investigated the neural correlates of decision-making under 
ambiguity in ASD or OCD using the IGT. In typically developing individuals, the 
IGT activates dorsolateral and ventromedial prefrontal, orbitofrontal, insular, 
posterior cingulate, and ventral striatal regions during the various stages of the 
decision-making process (Li et al., 2010). In light of a dearth of evidence in ASD and 
OCD specifically on the IGT, evidence can be compiled from studies examining 
related reward-based decision-making processes; during tasks of temporal discounting 
(Chantiluke et al., 2014b) and reversal learning (Chantiluke et al., 2015a), adolescents 
with ASD have shown abnormalities in related fronto-temporo-limbic systems 
mediating executive processes (Carlisi et al., 2016c) and ventromedial/fronto-limbic 
regions important for reward-related functions, especially those involving monetary 
gain/loss (Kohls et al., 2013). OCD has traditionally been conceptualized as a disorder 
of abnormalities in ventral affective systems including (orbito)fronto-striato-thalamo-
cortical networks as well as in lateral orbitofrontal-striatal systems important for 
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cognitive/inhibitory control (Zelazo and Müller, 2007, Menzies et al., 2008, Carlisi et 
al., 2016c). fMRI studies involving reward-related decision-making support evidence 
for abnormalities in both motivation control as well as cognitive control regions by 
showing that OCD patients relative to controls have hyperactivity in ventromedial 
prefrontal, orbitofrontal and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) regions projecting to 
ventral striatum and medio-dorsal thalamus, and underactivation in cortico-striato-
thalamic regions including dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), temporal and 
parietal cortices and basal ganglia (Menzies et al., 2008, Brem et al., 2012). 
 The relative lack of consistent findings in ASD and OCD on the IGT 
highlights a need for a better understanding of neurocognitive phenotypes of reward-
based decision-making in these disorders. Recent efforts such as the Research 
Domain Criteria (RDoC; (Insel et al., 2010)) stress the importance of investigating 
trans-diagnostic phenotypes which may be underpinned by shared and/or disorder-
specific neurofunctional mechanisms. Thus, we compared adolescents with ASD to 
those with OCD and typically developing controls to investigate shared and disorder-
specific brain function abnormalities during the IGT and compared reinforcement-
learning models to examine fine-grained differences in behavioural factors that might 
underlie overall decision-making. We hypothesized that both patient groups would be 
impaired on some aspect of task performance. Specifically, we hypothesised that 
OCD adolescents would show increased risky decision-making on the IGT compared 
to typically developing controls as evidenced by previous studies (Starcke et al., 2010, 
Grassi et al., 2015). Moreover, we hypothesised that OCD boys would show more 
brain-based impairments during loss and negative outcome based on the literature in 
this patient group of impaired error monitoring (Fitzgerald et al., 2005) and the 
clinical literature of the prototypical feeling that things need to be “just right” which 
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often characterises individuals with OCD (Coles et al., 2003). For ASD boys, we 
hypothesised this group would show lower choice-consistency compared to typically 
developing control participants (Johnson et al., 2006, Yechiam et al., 2010) and OCD 
patients. We tested whether differences were due to more nuanced shared or disorder-
specific differences in decision-making styles. Based on evidence from IGT studies in 
typically developing individuals showing that reward-based decision-making may be 
driven by dorsolateral and ventromedial/orbitofronto-striato-limbic function (Li et al., 
2010, Christakou et al., 2013a), we hypothesised that both groups would show 
abnormalities in these networks (Christakou et al., 2011, Brem et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, based on prior evidence of neurofunctional reward-related deficits in the 
two disorders, we hypothesised that both disorders would show abnormal reward 
processing in ventromedial-fronto-temporo-limbic (Kohls et al., 2013) regions 
important for reward-based decision-making and temporal foresight required by the 
task (Menzies et al., 2008).  However, we also expected disorder-specific stronger 
deficits in OCD in orbitofrontal regions and in ASD in ventral striatal and anterior 
cingulate regions based on respective deficits in these regions observed in each 
disorder  (Menzies et al., 2008, Kohls et al., 2013). 
Materials and methods 
Participants 
 
64 right-handed (Oldfield, 1971) boys (20 typically developing control boys, 
24 boys with ASD, 20 boys with OCD), 11-17 years-old, IQ>70 (Wechsler, 1999) 
participated. Medication-naïve ASD boys were recruited from local clinics. Clinical 
ASD diagnosis was made by a consultant psychiatrist using ICD-10 research 
diagnostic criteria (WHO, 1992) and confirmed using the Autism Diagnostic 
Interview-Revised (ADI-R (Lord et al., 1994)). The Autism Diagnostic Observation 
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Schedule (ADOS (Lord et al., 1989)) was also completed. All ASD boys reached 
clinical thresholds in all domains on the ADI-R (social, communication, 
restricted/stereotyped behaviour) and ADOS (communication, social). Parents of 
ASD boys also completed the Social Communication Questionnaire (SCQ; (Rutter et 
al., 2003)) and the Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire (SDQ; (Goodman and 
Scott, 1999)). ASD participants had a physical examination to exclude comorbid 
medical disorders and any abnormalities associated with ASD. Individuals with 
comorbid psychiatric conditions, including OCD and ADHD, were not included.   
  OCD boys were recruited from the Maudsley Hospital National & Specialist 
OCD clinic. Diagnosis was made by a consultant clinician using ICD-10 criteria and 
confirmed with the Children’s Yale-Brown Obsessive-Compulsive Scale (CY-BOCS; 
(Goodman et al., 1989)) and ancillary symptom checklist. Parents of OCD boys also 
completed the SDQ. OCD patients with comorbid psychiatric or neurological 
conditions, including ASD and ADHD, were excluded. Four boys were prescribed 
stable doses of antidepressants (see Supplement).  
 Twenty age- and handedness-matched typically developing control boys were 
recruited locally by advertisement. Controls did not meet clinical thresholds on the 
SDQ and SCQ for any disorder and did not have a current or lifetime history of any 
psychiatric condition.  
 Exclusion criteria for all subjects were comorbid psychiatric/medical disorders 
affecting brain development (e.g. epilepsy/psychosis), drug/alcohol dependency, 
history of head injury, genetic conditions associated with autism, abnormal structural 
MRI scans and MRI contraindications. Controls also participated in our fMRI study 
examining maturation of decision-making on the IGT, published previously 
(Christakou et al., 2013a). Most ASD and control participants also participated in 
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additional fMRI tasks during their visit, published elsewhere (Christakou et al., 2011, 
Christakou et al., 2013b, Chantiluke et al., 2014a, Murphy et al., 2014, Chantiluke et 
al., 2015a, Chantiluke et al., 2015b, Carlisi et al., 2016a). 
 This study was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. 
Ethical approval was obtained from the local Research Ethics Committee 
(05/Q0706/275). Study details were explained to participants and guardians. Written, 
informed assent/consent was obtained for all participants, and individuals were 
compensated for their time and travel expenses.  
Iowa Gambling Task  
 
 The fMRI version of the IGT used in this study is described in detail 
elsewhere (Christakou et al., 2009, Christakou et al., 2013a). Briefly, on each of 80 
trials, participants were presented with four card decks (A/B/C/D) on a screen and 
instructed to choose any deck by pressing the corresponding button with the right 
hand on an MR-compatible 5-button response box. They were instructed to win as 
much money as possible by the end of the task. They were only told that sometimes 
they would win money and sometimes they would lose money, and that some decks 
might be better than others. They were also told that their final amount won on the 
task would determine how much of a maximum £30 they would receive as 
compensation (in reality, all subjects received £30).  
Decks A and B were termed disadvantageous or “risky” decks because they 
returned relatively large gains (£190/£200/£210) but even larger losses 
(£240/£250/£260), leading to an overall net loss, whereas decks C and D were 
advantageous or “safe” because they returned small gains (£90/£100/£110) but even 
smaller losses (£40/£50/£60), resulting in a net gain. There was a 50% probability of 
winning or losing on each deck.  
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 Task performance is summarised by the ratio of advantageous choices to total 
choices or, the number of cards picked from decks C+D divided by the total number 
of cards picked (A+B+C+D). This ratio is proportional to the “net score” ((C+D)-
(A+B)) frequently used when quantifying performance on the IGT (Bechara et al., 
1994) without giving negative values. Ratios above 0.5 denote preference for safe 
relative to risky decks, while a ratio below 0.5 implies perseveration on risky choices 
despite accumulating losses. Responses where reaction time (RT) was less than 
200ms were considered ‘premature’ and these trials were not included in analyses 
(Thorpe et al., 1996).  
 This IGT task adaptation differs from other fMRI versions (e.g. (Lawrence et 
al., 2009)) in that choice was temporally separated from its outcome, 
haemodynamically decoupling choice and outcome evaluation, allowing separate 
examination of each. Subjects were given 3 seconds to respond. Following each 
choice, the chosen deck was superimposed with a 12-segment wheel ticking down 
every 0.5s for a total 6s until outcome presentation. If no response was made, the trial 
progressed directly to a blank screen for 9s. Positive (win) and negative (loss) 
outcomes were indicated by a happy or sad face presented below the deck and the 
amount won or lost indicated on the card. Outcomes were presented for 3s. Trials 
lasted 15s, ending with a blank screen after outcome presentation serving as an 
implicit baseline in the fMRI analysis. Omitted trials were excluded from analyses. 
The length of each inter-trial interval (ITI) was determined by the RT, which jittered 
trial events so as to maintain a 15s total trial duration. As these manipulations 
lengthened trial and task duration compared to other behavioural variants, this version 
of the task included 80 trials rather than the typical 100 trials (Bechara et al., 1994, 
Lawrence et al., 2009). Total task time was 21mins. Before testing, participants 
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practiced the task in a mock scanner, where 10 test trials presented equal payoffs 
across decks.  
Computational modelling 
  
 The IGT requires decision-making based on the learned outcomes of previous 
choices. Performance on the IGT can be influenced by a range of factors including 
learning rates, reward and loss sensitivity, or inconsistent responding (Ahn et al., 
2014). Thus, computational approaches are especially useful for understanding the 
processes underlying IGT performance. We used hierarchical Bayesian analysis 
(HBA) implemented within the hBayesDM R package (https://cran.r-
project.org/web/packages/hBayesDM/index.html) for computational modelling of 
IGT performance (Ahn et al., 2016). For further details of the methods, rationale and 
advantages of HBA over other modelling methods (e.g. maximum likelihood 
estimation), see Supplement and (Lee, 2011). HBA involves preparation of trial-by-
trial task data for each participant, model fitting and comparison of three commonly 
used and validated models of the IGT: the Prospect Valence Learning (PVL)-Decay 
Reinforcement Learning (RI) model, the PVL-Delta model and the Value-Plus-
Perseverance (VPP) model (Worthy et al., 2013a, Ahn et al., 2014, Steingroever et 
al., 2014).  
The PVL models focus on four parameters based on learning theory: α 
represents feedback sensitivity, 𝜆 represents loss-aversion, c represents choice 
consistency, and A represents learning rate (how much weight is placed on past 
experiences of a chosen deck vs. the most recent experience of that deck). These 
models are identical except that they use different learning rules; in the PVL-decayRI 
rule, expectancies of all decks are discounted on each trial, but in the PVL-Delta rule, 
only the expectancy of the selected deck is updated.  
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Based on previous simulation experiments (Worthy et al., 2013b), the VPP 
model combines the learning rule of the PVL-Delta model with the perseverance 
heuristic of win-stay-lose-switch choice behaviour. This model contains four 
additional perseverance parameters: k determines how much the perseverance 
strengths of all decks decay on each trial, εp and εn indicate loss/gain impact, 
respectively, on choice behaviour (i.e. stay/switch tendency), and ω is the 
reinforcement learning weight, i.e. the degree on which a subject relies on 
reinforcement learning over perseverative strategies. For complete model details, see 
Supplement and (Ahn et al., 2014, Ahn et al., 2016).  
Model fitting and comparison 
  
 Posterior inference for all models was performed via Markov Chain Monte 
Carlo (MCMC) sampling implemented in RStan (http://mc-stan.org/interfaces/rstan). 
Stan (v2.1.0 (Carpenter et al., 2016)) uses a specific probabilistic sampler called 
Hamiltonian Monte Carlo (HMC) to sample from the posterior distribution. For 
details, see (Kruschke, 2014, Ahn et al., 2016) and the Stan reference manual 
(http://mc-stan.org/documentation/).   
hBayesDM enables model fit assessment and post-hoc comparison via Widely 
Applicable Information Criterion (WAIC) (Watanabe, 2010). This index is obtained 
by computing the summed point-wise log-likelihood per participant, accounting for 
the fact that in the IGT, choices on a given trial are dependent on previous choices 
(Gelman et al., 2014). Smaller WAIC scores denote better model-fit, and overall fit is 
assessed by adding WAIC scores from each group for each model. 
Statistical Analysis 
 
All analyses were conducted in JASP (v0.8.1.1;https://jasp-stats.org/) using 
Bayesian analysis based on posterior probabilities rather than frequentist p-values, 
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which rely on the sampling intentions of the investigator. Models were favoured if 
BF10>10, indicating strong evidence for the tested model over the null hypothesis. In 
instances where BF10 was sufficiently large (>1000), Log(BF10) is reported, where 
values >1 indicate strong evidence for the model. For clarity, where appropriate, we 
also report null-hypothesis significance test (NHST) results, including p-values.  
ANOVAs tested for group-differences in demographic and questionnaire 
measures, and in task performance. Group-differences in mean parameter estimates 
were assessed by each parameter’s highest density interval (HDI), i.e. the range of 
parameter values that spans 95% of the distribution in a pairwise comparison (Ahn et 
al., 2014). A parameter was considered to significantly differ between groups if the 
HDI did not overlap 0.  Non-parametric correlations (Kendall’s Tau rank coefficients) 
were conducted to test for associations between task performance, symptoms and 
brain activation.  
fMRI Acquisition 
 
 Gradient echo echo-planar magnetic resonance imaging data were acquired on 
a GE Signa 3-Tesla scanner (General Electric, Waukesha WI) at the Centre for 
Neuroimaging Sciences, King’s College London, using a semi-automated image 
quality-control procedure (Simmons et al., 1999). A quadrature birdcage head coil 
was used for radiofrequency transmission and reception. In each of 22 non-contiguous 
places, we acquired 800 T2*-weighted images depicting blood oxygenation-level 
dependent (BOLD) response covering the whole brain (echo time (TE)=30ms, 
repetition time (TR)=1.5s, flip angle=60o, in-plane resolution=3.75mm, slice 
thickness=5.0mm, slice skip=0.5mm). A whole-brain high-resolution structural image 
with 43 slices was also acquired (TE=40ms, TR=3s, flip angle=90o, slice thickness, 
3.0mm, slice skip=0.3 mm).  
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fMRI data analysis 
 
fMRI data were analysed using a non-parametric permutation-based software 
developed at the Institute of Psychiatry, Psychology and Neuroscience (XBAM v4.1; 
http://brainmap.co.uk) which avoids issues such as false positives that are related to 
parametric statistical analyses (Eklund et al., 2016). In contrast to normal theory-
based inference, this approach minimizes assumptions and uses median rather than 
mean-based statistics to control for outlier effects. Its most commonly used test 
statistic is computed by standardizing for individual differences in residual noise 
before performing second-level multi-subject testing using robust permutation-based 
methods. This allows a mixed-effects approach to analysis that has been 
recommended following analysis of the validity and impact of theory-based inference 
in fMRI (Thirion et al., 2007). Details of individual and group-level analyses are 
described elsewhere (Christakou et al., 2009) and in the Supplement.       
 Briefly, fMRI data were realigned to minimize motion-related artefacts and 
smoothed with a Gaussian filter (full-width at half-maximum 8.82mm) (Bullmore et 
al., 1999). Time-series analysis of individual subject activation was performed with 
wavelet-based resampling described in (Bullmore et al., 2001). We first convolved the 
task epoch of each event of interest (choice, anticipation, outcome) with two Poisson 
model functions (4s and 8s delays). Using rigid-body and affine transformation, 
individual maps were registered into Talairach space (Talairach and Tournoux, 1988). 
Group maps were then produced for each experimental condition, and hypothesis 
testing was performed using cluster-level analysis, shown to give excellent cluster-
wise type-I error control (Bullmore et al., 2001). Time-series permutation was used to 
compute the distribution of the statistic of interest under the null hypothesis. The 
voxel-level threshold was set to 0.05 to give maximum sensitivity and to avoid type-II 
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errors. Then, a cluster-mass threshold was computed from the distribution of cluster 
masses in the wavelet-permuted data such that the final expected number of Type-I 
error clusters under the null hypothesis was less than one per whole brain. Given that 
brain activation changes with age during development (Rubia et al., 2010, Rubia et 
al., 2013), and hence to control for possible effects of non-significant group-
differences in age, age was included as a covariate of no interest in the fMRI analyses. 
However, because groups did not differ in age, analyses were repeated to confirm that 
inclusion of this covariate did not significantly affect results.  
To more specifically focus on areas implicated in the IGT and 
reward/punishment processing (Li et al., 2010), additional analyses were conducted 
using a region of interest (ROI) approach based on a priori hypotheses. Search space 
was restricted to a single mask comprising bilateral orbitofrontal cortex, medial 
frontal gyrus, inferior frontal gyrus (opercularis), inferior frontal gyrus (triangularis), 
insula, putamen, caudate and nucleus accumbens. Regions were extracted from the 
Harvard-Oxford atlas using FSL (Smith et al., 2004), nonlinearly converted from 
Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) coordinates into Talairach coordinates using 
the MNI2TAL program (http://imaging.mrc-cbu.cam.ac.uk/imaging/MniTalairach) 
and combined in XBAM. Within the mask, <1 false-positive cluster was expected 
with thresholds of p<0.05 for voxel and p<0.03 for cluster comparisons.    
Results 
Participant characteristics 
 Groups did not differ in age or IQ (Table 1). As expected, groups differed on 
SDQ total and sub-scores. Post-hoc tests correcting for multiple comparisons showed 
that all groups differed on SDQ total-scores (all Log(BF10)>3, p<0.001). ASD boys 
were more impaired on peer, pro-social and hyperactivity/inattention sub-scales 
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compared to typically-developing controls and OCD boys (all Log(BF10)>4, 
p<0.001), who did not differ. On the conduct sub-scale, ASD boys differed from 
controls only (Log(BF10)=2.64, p<0.003). On the emotion sub-scale, controls differed 
from ASD and OCD boys (both Log(BF10)>7, p<0.001), who did not differ from each 
other.   
Performance data   
 Groups did not differ on their preference ratio for safe decks across the entire 
task (BF10=0.16, F(2,63)=.65, p=.53) or in group-by-block (4 blocks of 20 trials each) 
interaction analysis (BF10=0.01, F(2,62)=0.35, p=0.71), with strong evidence in 
favour of the null hypothesis (BF01=219.05). Task performance is further summarized 
in Supplementary Figures S1 and S2.  
Movement 
 
Groups did not significantly differ on minimum (BF10=0.13, F(2,63)=0.03, 
p=0.97), maximum (BF10=0.36, F(2,63)=1.37, p=0.26) or mean (BF10=0.19, 
F(2,63)=0.49, p=0.61) head-translation in 3D-Euclidian space .  
Model comparison 
 
 We first tested which model provided the best fit for the data by comparing 
WAIC scores (Supplementary Table S1), with lower WAIC scores indicating better 
model-fits. Results suggested that the VPP model (WAICtotal=11387.78) provided the 
best model-fit relative to the other two models (PVL-DecayRI WAICtotal=12502.34; 
PVL-Delta WAICtotal=12812.60) in all three groups, consistent with previous studies 
(Worthy et al., 2013a, Ahn et al., 2014).   
 We used the winning VPP model to compare parameter estimates among 
groups (Table 2). Typically developing controls showed greater choice sensitivity (c) 
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compared to ASD (95% HDI from 0.83 to 4.54, mean of HDI=2.69; t(20.4)=32.93, 
p<0.001) and OCD boys (95% HDI from 1.44 to 4.22, mean of HDI=2.83; 
t(19.2)=34.19, p<0.001). Controls also showed higher reinforcement learning weights 
(ω) than ASD (95% HDI from 0.46 to 0.98, mean of HDI=0.72; t(23.6)=26.13, 
p<0.001) and OCD boys (95% HDI from 0.45 to 0.97, mean of HDI=0.71; 
t(20.2)=39.96, p<0.001). ASD boys showed greater perseverance decay rates (k) 
compared to controls (95% HDI from -0.44 to -0.06, mean of HDI=-0.25; t(33.8)=-
5.21, p<0.001) and OCD boys (95% HDI from 0.005 to 0.47, mean of HDI=0.24; 
t(42)=3.75, p=0.001). A complete table of differential distributions is presented in 
Supplementary Table S2. 
Group maps of brain activation 
 
 Images of within-group brain activation for choice (risky vs. safe), 
anticipation, and outcome (win vs. loss) phases are presented in Supplementary 
Figure S3. 
Group effect-choice  
 
 Whole-brain analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) including age as a covariate 
compared brain activation during the choice phase (risky vs. safe choices) and showed 
a main effect of group in left DLPFC extending into superior frontal gyrus (Table 
3A;Figure 2A). Post-hoc comparisons revealed that this was due to controls 
activating this region more during risky choices relative to both ASD (BF10=82.98, 
p<0.001) and OCD subjects (BF10=13.97, p=0.02).  
 When the search space was constrained to the fronto-striatal ROIs, controls 
had increased activation to risky choices relative to ASD (BF10=2.83, p=0.03) and 
OCD (BF10=7.89, p=0.005) boys in right IFG/insula (Table 3A;Figure 2B). No 
group differences were observed in any of the other ROIs. 
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 Excluding the 4 medicated OCD boys from analyses had no effect on the main 
findings.   
Group effect-anticipation  
 
 Whole brain ANCOVA comparing brain activation during outcome 
anticipation showed a group-effect in two regions: left IFG/insula/inferior temporal 
lobe and left pre/post-central gyrus extending into PCC. This was due to shared 
underactivation in both regions in ASD (left IFG/insula/inferior temporal lobe: 
BF10=164.47,p=0.003; pre/postcentral gyrus/PCC: BF10=5.25,p=0.05) and OCD boys 
(left IFG/insula/inferior temporal lobe: BF10=8.29,p=0.04; pre/postcentral gyrus/PCC: 
BF10=55.60,p=0.002) relative to typically developing controls (Table 3B;Figure 2C).  
 ROI analysis revealed two clusters that significantly differed among groups, 
one of which was observed in the whole-brain analysis (see above): left IFG/insula, 
extending in the ROI analysis into VLPFC/OFC, and in right ventral striatum (VS), 
including nucleus accumbens, caudate and putamen. Post-hoc comparisons showed 
shared reduction in both clusters in ASD (IFG/insula/OFC: BF10=79.65,p=0.002; VS: 
BF10=101.61,p=0.004) and OCD (IFG/insula/OFC: BF10=7.82,p=0.04; VS: 
BF10=122.07,p<0.001) boys versus typically developing controls (Table 3B;Figure 
2D).  
When the 4 medicated OCD boys were excluded from analyses, all group-
difference clusters remained, but the difference in the right VS cluster from the ROI 
analysis was observed only at a reduced threshold of p=0.07 in patients relative to 
controls.  
Group effect-outcome  
 
 Whole-brain analyses comparing activation differences during outcome 
presentation showed no effect of group when wins vs. losses were contrasted. 
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However, ROI analysis revealed a group effect in the left IFG/insula, which was due 
to ASD boys having disorder-specific enhanced activation to wins relative to typically 
developing controls (BF10=237.61, p<0.001) and OCD boys (BF10=31.60, p=0.003), 
who had more activation in this region to losses relative to ASD boys (Table 
3C;Figure 2E). Excluding the 4 medicated OCD boys had no effect on the main 
findings. Moreover, when all analyses were repeated excluding age as covariate, 
results remained largely unchanged. 
Associations between symptom measures and task performance/brain activation 
  
 After correction for multiple comparisons, there was no relationship between 
symptom measures and any parameter estimate or overall advantageous preference 
ratio in the ASD or OCD group. There was no statistically significant correlation 
between symptom measures and brain activation among ASD or OCD boys.  
Associations between task performance and brain activation 
 
 In the control group, higher advantageous preference ratios were associated 
with increased activation to risky vs. safe choices in left DLFPC (r=0.43, BF10=7.99, 
p=0.007), and with increased activation during outcome anticipation in left IFG 
(r=0.45, BF10=11.12, p=0.005). 
 Parameter estimates or overall performance were not associated with brain 
activation in ASD or OCD boys. 
Discussion   
 
 This is the first study to investigate the underlying neural correlates of IGT 
performance both in ASD and OCD and the first study to compare the two disorders 
in fMRI during decision-making. Individuals with ASD and OCD shared differences 
in decision-making strategies with regard to decreased choice consistency and 
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reliance on reinforcement learning compared to controls, in order to achieve overall 
similar task performance compared to typically developing boys. Furthermore, ASD 
and OCD boys showed shared neurofunctional underactivation relative to controls 
during decision-making in left dorsolateral prefrontal and right inferior fronto-insular 
regions and in lateral inferior/orbito-fronto-striatal regions and PCC during outcome 
anticipation. During outcome presentation, however, ROI analyses showed that ASD 
boys had disorder-specific enhanced activation to wins vs. losses in a left inferior 
fronto-insular region relative to OCD boys and controls.   
 The computational modelling results suggest that, despite overall comparable 
performance to typically developing controls, ASD and OCD boys used shared 
decision-making strategies that differed from controls to achieve this performance. 
OCD and ASD participants were less consistent in their choices, in line with previous 
evidence of increased switching behaviour on the IGT in ASD adolescents (Johnson 
et al., 2006, Yechiam et al., 2010) that may relate to underlying difficulties with 
implicit learning and cognitive flexibility (Johnson et al., 2006, Solomon et al., 2015). 
The present work extends this evidence to OCD, suggesting that increased exploration 
(independent of outcome sensitivity) may be a shared trans-diagnostic behavioural 
phenotype of decision-making. Moreover, the finding of lower reinforcement learning 
weights in both patient groups compared to typically developing controls suggests 
that ASD and OCD individuals less effectively implemented reversal learning 
strategies to maximise outcomes and instead used a different strategy (e.g. 
exploration), in line with impaired reward learning in OCD (Nielen et al., 2009) and 
ASD (Scott-Van Zeeland et al., 2010). Taken together, this suggests that patients may 
achieve performance similar to controls via enhanced exploration and less reliance on 
learning from experienced outcomes. Moreover, perseverance strengths decayed at a 
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faster rate in the ASD group compared to the OCD and control groups, in line with 
evidence that ASD individuals have a tendency to switch decks more frequently 
(Johnson et al., 2006). This effect may be dissociable from the disorder-shared 
decreased choice consistency that was also observed in OCD, as choices on previous 
decks have less influence on future choices, regardless of reward/punishment 
valuation on a given deck. 
Whole-brain fMRI analysis results showed that both patient groups shared 
reduced activation in left DLPFC during decision-making relative to typically 
developing controls, and these results were extended to the right IFG/insula in ROI 
analyses. Lateral PFC is important for value representation (Ridderinkhof et al., 
2004), and more specifically, DLPFC has been implicated in working memory, 
important for incorporating known information during decision deliberation (Li et al., 
2010). DLPFC activation during decision-making under ambiguity has consistently 
been observed in typically developing populations (Krain et al., 2006). Moreover, 
ventrolateral prefrontal regions and the insula are related to emotional attribute of 
decision options and are part of a ‘saliency network’ implicated in stimulus 
significance and affective response (Phillips et al., 2003). IGT performance and 
neural representation of decision values in dorso- and ventrolateral PFC mature with 
age, suggesting development of a decision-making network incorporating action 
values with executive processes (Christakou et al., 2013a). Thus, the present findings 
could imply abnormalities in the functional maturation of these regions in ASD and 
OCD. Furthermore, enhanced activation in left DLPFC to risky vs. safe decks was 
related to better performance in controls, whereas this relationship was not observed 
in ASD or OCD individuals. Given the DLPFC’s role in integrating memory 
representations with goal-directed behaviour (Ridderinkhof et al., 2004), this may 
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suggest that ASD and OCD individuals have neurofunctional deficits in updating 
reward expectation. Moreover, in ASD, reduced DLPFC activation has been found 
during reversal learning, suggesting that abnormalities in this region may relate to 
problems in flexibly updating choice behaviour due to abnormalities with implicit 
learning that may also influence choice consistency on the IGT (D'Cruz et al., 2016). 
 Whole-brain results showed that both patient groups relative to typically 
developing controls had reduced activation in left OFC/VLPFC/IFG/insula during 
outcome anticipation. These results were confirmed as well as extended to right 
BG/VS in ROI analyses. This is in line with evidence in OCD of decreased lateral 
orbitofrontal activation during outcome presentation on a reversal-learning task 
(Remijnse et al., 2006, Chamberlain et al., 2008) and reward anticipation (Jung et al., 
2011) and extends this evidence to ASD. In OCD, OFC deficits have been linked to 
impaired reward-related learning and to an inability to detect changes in 
reinforcement contingencies (Menzies et al., 2008), and the present findings suggest 
that this phenotype may be shared with ASD, in line with evidence in ASD of fronto-
limbic abnormalities during reward gain/loss, independent of valence (Kohls et al., 
2013). Moreover, cognitive inflexibility has been associated with OCD, affecting 
goal-directed decision-making and learning (Gillan and Robbins, 2014). A previous 
study found that OCD adolescents had reduced left IFG activation compared to 
controls during set-shifting (Britton et al., 2010). Moreover, a study of reward 
reversal-learning found that ASD adults had reduced VS as well as left DLFPC and 
parietal activation compared to controls (D'Cruz et al., 2016), in line with our findings 
of disorder-shared reduced activation in these regions, implicating these areas in a 
range of reward-related processes that may be affected in both ASD and OCD.  
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The basal ganglia, and more specifically the caudate and VS, have been 
consistently implicated in reward expectation and value representation (Dichter et al., 
2012a). This region is particularly relevant to OCD given the prominence of fronto-
striatal networks in the neurofunctional characterization of the disorder (Menzies et 
al., 2008). ROI findings of disorder-shared blunted VS response during reward 
anticipation are in line with previous findings of similar underactive VS response 
during ambiguous reward anticipation in ASD (Dichter et al., 2012b, Kohls et al., 
2013, D'Cruz et al., 2016) and OCD (Menzies et al., 2008, Figee et al., 2011) as well 
as depression (Smoski et al., 2009) and schizophrenia (Juckel et al., 2006), suggesting 
the possibility of a shared neurobiology among a range of disorders with regard to 
fronto-striatal under-responsiveness to anticipated reward.  
 ROI analyses revealed that ASD boys had disorder-specific increased 
activation in left IFG/insula to positive (wins) vs. negative (losses) feedback relative 
to OCD boys and typically developing controls, who both had more activation to loss 
in this region. Some studies have found insula hyperactivation during reward in ASD 
(Cascio et al., 2012, Dichter et al., 2012c), and another found enhanced left frontal 
activation in ASD individuals during rewarded outcomes (Schmitz et al., 2008), 
implying that reward-related left-frontal systems are enhanced in ASD (Cascio et al., 
2012). This is in line with the insula’s role in interoceptive awareness as part of the 
proposed ‘saliency network’ (Critchley et al., 2004, Menon and Uddin, 2010), 
suggested to be affected in ASD individuals (Uddin and Menon, 2009), and suggests 
that similar systems are intact in OCD patients during reward processing.  
 This study has several limitations. While psychiatric comorbidity was an 
exclusion criterion, we cannot discard the possibility that sub-threshold symptoms of 
other disorders were present in our sample. Moreover, ASD participants were not 
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assessed using OCD-specific measures, e.g. CY-BOCS, (and vice-versa). 
Nonetheless, thorough clinical assessment of ASD and OCD participants and 
inclusion of mostly medication-naïve patients are study strengths, and absence of 
comorbidity was confirmed by a consultant psychiatrist in all cases. Four OCD boys 
were prescribed SSRIs. Although there is evidence for neurofunctional effects of 
serotonin during decision-making (Murphy et al., 2008), results largely remained 
when medication was accounted for, although the right VS cluster was seen only at a 
reduced threshold, suggesting a possibility that medication may have influenced brain 
activation during reward anticipation in this region. However, it is more likely that 
this secondary analysis was underpowered. Moreover, we found no association 
between symptom severity and performance measures, which is possibly due to 
patient/symptom heterogeneity in our clinical groups. However, it is also possible 
that, while fMRI analyses were adequately powered to detect neurobiological 
differences (Thirion et al., 2007), correlation analyses may have been underpowered 
to detect behavioural associations, and behavioural analyses may have been 
underpowered to detect effects on the somewhat simplistic measure of advantageous 
preference ratio. Future studies should aim to also assess trans-diagnostic, trait-based 
measures that may more accurately capture individual differences or 
cognitive/behavioural subtypes within each disorder.  
 The aim of this study was to compare as a first step relatively “pure” cases of 
disorders to understand disorder-specific abnormalities. However, given the common 
co-occurrence between ASD and OCD, future studies should investigate to what 
extent the co-morbid presentation of ASD and OCD differs from the pure disorders to 
elucidate the underlying neural mechanisms underlying this overlap and co-
occurrence. Understanding the neurobiology of the comorbid condition and whether 
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related neural dysfunction resembles brain dysfunction typical of ASD or of OCD 
independently would also be very relevant for treatment. In line with a recent study 
comparing these groups during temporal discounting (Carlisi et al., 2017), another 
“hot” EF task, there were predominantly shared neurofunctional abnormalities 
between ASD and OCD. However, another recent study comparing these groups 
during sustained attention, a “cool” EF task, found predominantly OCD-specific 
abnormalities that were not observed in ASD boys compared to controls (Carlisi et al., 
2016b). The main aim of comparing different diagnostic groups with fMRI is to 
identify shared and different underlying neurobiological substrates that could be 
targeted in interventions (e.g. pharmacological, behavioural, neurofeedback). If we 
are able to understand the fine-grained cognitive and neurofunctional mechanisms 
driving differences and similarities between ASD and OCD patients and typically 
developing adolescents, and if the findings are replicated across future studies and 
across a wider range of tasks, this could potentially have implications for findings of 
disorder-specific biomarkers that could be targeted in differential treatments for the 
two disorders. Therefore, the present findings suggest that diagnostic differentiation 
may not map on to neurobiological differentiation in the context of “hot” EF and that 
treatments could exploit the neurofunctional abnormalities that are shared in these 
disorders. For example, brain stimulation or fMRI neurofeedback studies could target 
regions such as the dmPFC that are involved in “hot” EF and implicated in both 
disorders. In line with this, it is interesting to note that SSRIs are often used in the 
treatment of individuals with ASD and with OCD (Soomro et al., 2008, Benvenuto et 
al., 2013), providing further support for shared biological mechanisms underpinning 
specific aspects of these disorders that may have treatment implications. However, 
such theories should be empirically tested, and these two different diagnostic groups 
 Carlisi et al., 2016 
 
27 
 
should be compared to a comorbid group to elucidate the underlying neurofunctional 
substrates of the co-occurring presentation that would be important for the 
development of neuroscience-based treatment for psychiatric disorders. 
Conclusions 
 
 This first behavioural and fMRI comparison of ASD and OCD adolescents on 
the IGT showed that ASD and OCD patients used different decision-making strategies 
relative to typically developing controls in that they were less consistent in their 
choices and relied less on reinforcement learning to achieve overall performance 
comparable to controls. ASD adolescents, moreover, had distinctive perseverative 
task performance in that they showed higher perseverance decay rates compared to 
OCD and typically developing boys. This was underpinned by predominantly shared 
neurofunctional deficits relative to typically developing controls in dorsal and ventral 
prefrontal regions during decision making and in orbitofrontal-ventral striatal regions 
during reward and loss processing, as shown by both whole-brain and ROI analyses. 
ASD patients, however, had disorder-specific enhanced inferior frontal/insular 
activation to reward feedback in the ROI analysis, suggesting a possible 
neurofunctional signature of reward-based decision-making on the IGT that may be 
unique to ASD. This study provides novel insight into underlying neurobiological and 
behavioural mechanisms that shed light on trans-diagnostic phenotypes of reward-
learning and decision-making in the two disorders that may drive respective clinical 
characteristics of executive impairments in each disorder.  
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Tables and Figure Legends 
Table 1. Participant characteristics 
 
Variables 
TDC 
(N=20) 
Mean(SD) 
ASD 
(N=24) 
Mean(SD) 
OCD 
(N=20) 
Mean(SD) 
F test (DF) p-value 
Log 
(BF10) 
Age (years) 15.1(2.0) 14.6(1.6) 15.7(1.4) 2.7(2,61) 0.08 -0.03 
IQ 119.7(11.9) 113.1(14.3) 117.7(13.4) 1.4(2,61) 0.25 -0.99 
SCQ total score (t-test) 2.2(2.3) 16.5(7.4) - 8.3(42) <0.001 17.26 
SDQ total score 5.0(3.9) 19.5(6.8) 12.5(5.6) 36.2(2,61) < 0.001 19.03 
SDQ emotional 
distress  
0.7(1.7) 4.3(2.8) 4.4(2.6) 14.6(2,61) < 0.001 7.88 
SDQ conduct  0.9(1.3) 2.6(2.2) 1.9(1.5) 5.6(2,61) 0.006 2.07 
SDQ peer relations  1.6(2.5) 6.5(2.4) 3.3(3.0) 19.8(2,61) < 0.001 11.05 
SDQ hyperactive 
impulsive/inattentive  
2.2(1.9) 6.2(2.4) 3.0(2.7) 17.9(2,61) < 0.001 9.96 
SDQ prosocial 
behaviour  
8.6(2.4) 4.5(2.4) 7.7(2.6) 17.4(2,61) < 0.001 9.68 
ADOS communication 
score 
- 3.6(1.2) - - - 
 
ADOS social 
interaction score 
- 9.0(2.3) - - - 
 
ADOS 
communication+social 
- 12.7(3.1) - - - 
 
ADOS stereotypy 
score 
- 1.5(1.5) - - - 
 
ADI communication 
score 
- 16.6(4.7) - - - 
 
ADI social interaction 
score 
- 20.0(5.3) - - - 
 
ADI repetitive 
behaviour score 
- 6.5(2.4) - - - 
 
CY-BOCS total score - - 22.3(5.8) - -  
CY-BOCS – 
obsessions 
- - 10.8(3.6) - - 
 
CY-BOCS – 
compulsions 
- - 12.0(3.1) - - 
 
Abbreviations: ADI-Autism Diagnostic Interview, ADOS-Autism Diagnostic Observation 
Schedule, ASD-Autism Spectrum Disorder, CY-BOCS-Childrens’ Yale-Brown Obsessive-
Compulsive Symptom Checklist, DF-degrees of freedom, OCD-Obsessive-Compulsive 
Disorder, SCQ-Social Communication Questionnaire, SD-standard deviation, SDQ-Strengths 
and Difficulties Questionnaire. TDC-typically developing controls. Note, Log(BF10) is reported 
for Bayesian analyses, as BF10 values were consistently high.  
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Table 2. Parameter estimates from the VPP model 
 
Parameter 
TDC(N=20) 
mean(SD) 
ASD(N=24) 
mean(SD) 
OCD(N=20) 
mean(SD) 
Learning rate (A) 0.01(0.01) 0.44(0.22) 0.24(0.15) 
Feedback sensitivity (α) 0.14(0.06) 0.61(0.13) 0.96(0.43) 
Choice sensitivity (c) 3.16(0.33) 0.72(0.07) 0.66(0.02) 
Loss aversion (λ) 0.22(0.08) 4.70(1.65) 4.91(2.27) 
Loss impact (εp) -1.38(0.87) -1.69(2.97) -1.80(1.16) 
Gain impact (εn) -0.84(1.33) -0.76(2.75) -1.07(2.16) 
Perseverance decay rate (k) 0.42(0.08) 0.63(0.17) 0.44(0.16) 
Reinforcement learning weight 
(ω) 
0.94(0.01) 0.25(0.13) 0.26(0.08) 
Abbreviations: ASD-Autism Spectrum Disorder, OCD-Obsessive-Compulsive 
Disorder, SD-standard deviation, TDC- typically developing controls, VPP-value-
plus-perseverance.  
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Table 3. ANCOVA results of brain activation differences between typically 
developing control boys, boys with ASD, and boys with OCD 
Contrast Regions of activation 
Brodmann 
areas 
Peak 
Talairach 
coordinates 
(x,y,z) 
Voxels 
Cluster 
p-value 
(A) Choice (risky-safe) 
Whole-brain      
TDC>ASD,OCD  L DLPFC, superior 
frontal gyrus 
6/8/9/46 -33,4,64 302 0.004 
ROI       
ASD,OCD>TDC  R IFG, insula 45 36,22,4 51 0.009 
(B) Anticipation (vs. baseline) 
Whole-brain      
TDC>ASD,OCD L IFG, insula, 
inferior temporal 
47 -40,26,-7 198 0.01 
TDC>ASD,OCD L pre/postcentral, 
PCC  
6 -36,-15,26 225 0.01 
ROI      
TDC>ASD,OCD L IFG, insula, 
VLPFC, OFC 
47 -40,26,-13 83 0.006 
TDC>ASD,OCD R VS, NAcc, 
caudate, putamen 
- 7,4,-7 58 0.01 
(C) Outcome (win-loss) 
Whole-brain       
No suprathreshold clusters 
ROI      
ASD>C,OCD L IFG/insula 45/47 -33,30,-13 39 0.02 
Abbreviations: ACC-anterior cingulate cortex, ASD-Autism Spectrum Disorder, , 
DLPFC-dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, IFG-inferior frontal gyrus, L-left, OCD-
obsessive-compulsive disorder, OFC-orbitofrontal cortex, PCC-posterior cingulate 
cortex, ROI-region of interest, TDC- typically developing controls, VLPFC-
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, VS-ventral striatum. BOLD regions=cluster-peak.  
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Figure 1. Schematic diagram of the Iowa Gambling Task (Christakou et al., 
2013). Participants were initially “loaned” £2000, indicated by the red bar, and money 
won/lost was added to/deducted from this amount, indicated by the current running 
total, depicted by the green bar. At the start of each trial, participants were presented 
with 4 decks of cards and asked to choose one by pressing with the right hand one of 
four buttons on an MR-compatible response box. Participants were given 3 seconds to 
make a response, and their choice (reaction time – RT) was followed by an 
anticipation period of 6 seconds, during which a 12 segment circle was presented that 
counted down the 6 seconds in steps of 0.5 seconds. Outcome of the decision (wins = 
green card, happy face; losses = red card, sad face) was presented for 3 seconds, after 
which a blank screen (inter-trial interval – ITI) was presented for a variable 3 seconds, 
determined by the RT, resulting in a total trial duration of 15 seconds (RT (up to 3s) + 
anticipation (6s) + outcome (3s) + ITI  (3s or more if RT was less than 3s)= 15s).  
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Figure 2. Between-group differences in brain activation between control boys, 
boys with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and boys with obsessive-compulsive 
disorder (OCD). Analysis of variance (ANOVA) showing the main effect of group 
on brain activation for the three phases of the Iowa Gambling Task. (A) Whole-brain 
results of the group effect during decision-making (choice phase, safe vs. risky), (B) 
Region of interest (ROI) results of the group effect during decision-making (choice 
phase, safe vs. risky), (C) Whole-brain results of the group effect during outcome 
anticipation, (D) ROI results of the group effect during outcome anticipation, (E) ROI 
results of the group effect during outcome presentation (win vs. loss). Talairach z-
coordinates are shown for slice distance (in mm) from the intercommissural line. The 
right side of the image corresponds with the right side of the brain. * indicates 
significance at the p<0.05 level, ** indicates significance at the p<0.01 level, *** 
indicates significance at the p<0.001 level 
 
 
 
 
 
